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From Handles to Interventions: Commentary on R.G. Collingwood, “The So-Called 
Idea of Causation” 
 
I.  
   
R. G. Collingwood’s paper, “ On the So-Called Idea of Causation” ranges over a 
large number of topics connected with the notion of cause, but probably the portion of the 
paper that has attracted the most interest, both within and outside philosophy,  is his 
discussion of  what he calls “sense II” of “cause” (one of three senses of this notion that 
Collingwood distinguishes). He writes:  
 
In sense II, … the word cause expresses an idea relative to human action: the 
action in this case is an action intended to control, not other human beings, but 
things in “nature”, or “physical” things. In this sense, the “cause” of an event in 
nature is the handle, so to speak, by which we can manipulate it…. 
   
This sense of the word may be defined as follows.  A cause is an event or state of 
things which (i) it is in our power to produce or prevent, and (ii) by producing or 
preventing which we can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be. 
(p.89) 
 
 (Italics in original. I have inserted the roman numerals (i) and (ii) in order to refer back 
to the separate clauses of this definition.)  
He adds   
 
The search for causes in sense II is “natural science” in that sense of the phrase in 
which natural science is what Aristotle calls a “practical science,” valued not for 
its truth pure and simple but for its utility, for the “power over nature” (p.90)   
 
This is a statement of what is sometimes called a manipulability (or manipulationist) 
notion of causation, the basic idea being that a cause is a factor such that if it were 
possible to appropriately manipulate it, there would be an associated change in the effect. 
Broadly similar ideas have been defended by a number of other philosophers, including 
Gasking, 1955, von Wright, 1971, and Price, 1991, as well other researchers described 
below.  Similar ideas are also common in many other disciplines, including econometrics, 
and statistics, as well as medicine.    
The past several decades have seen the development of accounts of causation (and 
associated accounts of testing for causal relationships) that can be thought of as broadly 
manipulationist in spirit but that go well beyond the formulation provided by 
Collingwood—these include Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, 2000, Pearl, 2000, and, in 
the philosophical literature, Woodward, 2003. A central concept in these accounts is the 
notion of an “intervention” (see below) and the associated idea that causal claims can be 
illuminated in various ways by construing them as claims about the outcomes of 
hypothetical experiments
1
. In what follows I first discuss some aspects of Collingwood’s 
paper and then try to place the paper in the context of these more recent contributions.   
  Manipulability accounts of causation have an obvious appeal. For one thing they 
seem to explain (at least in part) why we ought to care about whether a relationship is 
causal (rather than non-causal or “merely correlational”). Since we care about 
manipulation and control, particularly in “practical” subjects such as engineering and 
medicine, there is no mystery about why we also should care about the distinction 
between relationships that can be exploited for purposes of manipulation and control and 
those that cannot, and this is exactly the distinction between causal and non-causal 
relationships, according to the manipulationist conception.  In addition, manipulationist 
conceptions of causation provide a transparent connection between the content of causal 
claims and one important way of testing such claims – via experimentation.  Because 
manipulationist accounts tell us to interpret causal claims as   claims about what would 
happen to some candidate effect if the candidate cause were to be experimentally 
manipulated, they make it obvious why, in order to test a causal claim, it is relevant to 
actually perform the indicated experiment if one can do that.  
  Despite this, philosophical assessment of manipulability accounts has been largely 
negative, for several reasons
2
. First, such accounts have struck many philosophers as 
leading to a conception of causation that is unacceptably anthropomorphic and 
“subjective”.  This is because, at least as often formulated, such accounts seem to make 
the truth or “meaning” of causal claims dependent on facts about what human beings can 
or can’t do. This is true of Collingwood’s formulation, for example, since it explicitly 
makes whether X causes Y (in Collingwood’s sense II) dependent on whether it is in the 
power of human beings to manipulate X (cf. clause (i) from the quotation above); in cases 
in which a causal claim   involves an unmanipulable cause (“the gravitational attraction 
of the moon causes the motion of the tides”), the logic of Collingwood’s position requires 
him to hold that this involves a completely distinct notion of cause (his sense III.)  For a 
variety of reasons this seems implausible—see my discussion below. A more satisfactory 
position is that causal relationships involving causes not currently manipulable by 
humans involve the same sense or concept of cause as relationships involving 
manipulable causes. 
A second source of concern about manipulability accounts is that they have 
seemed to many philosophers to be objectionably circular, in the sense that they attempt 
to use notions that are causal in character (like “manipulation”) to explicate what is for 
one factor to cause another. If (as seems plausible) “manipulate” means something like 
“cause to change”, how can we use the notion of manipulation to get any independent 
purchase on the notion of causation?  Many philosophers have supposed that a 
satisfactory account of causation must be “reductive” in the sense of explaining this 
notion in terms of concepts that do not themselves carry causal commitments, such as 
                                                 
1
  The potential outcomes framework developed by Rubin, 1974 also makes use of the 
idea that causal claims can be understood as claims about the outcomes of potential 
experiments,  and thus is “manipulationist” in spirit but does not make explicit use of the 
notion of an intervention.  Pearl, 2000 shows how the potential outcomes framework can 
be captured within a structural equations framework, given the notion of an intervention.  
2
  See, e.g., the discussion in Hausman, 1998, 86ff. 
“correlation”. Interestingly,  non-philosophers interested in causal inference, including 
those advocating manipulability theories  do not share this concern about reduction, as 
will become apparent below.     
 A final concern is this: even if it is conceded (as suggested above) that 
manipulability accounts yield some insight into the special role of experimentation in 
establishing causal claims, what use are they in contexts in which we must rely on non-
experimental evidence in establishing causal claims? What use is it to be told that if it 
were possible to manipulate X and Y would change under this manipulation, then X 
causes Y, if we cannot in fact manipulate X?   
 
II. 
 I believe it is possible to provide satisfactory responses to all of these concerns, 
thus vindicating the basic thrust of the manipulability account. However, in order to do 
so, we must refine Collingwood’s formulation.  As a point of departure, consider the 
following difficulty, which is distinct from those mentioned above. Suppose that some 
factor C is a common cause of two correlated joint effects E1 and E2, and that there is no 
direct causal relationship between E1 and E2, themselves, as represented in the following 
directed graph.   
 
E1C E2 
 
As an illustration, C might measure whether a subject smokes, E1 might measure 
whether or not the subject has yellow fingers, and E2 whether the subject develops lung 
cancer.  Whether a subject has yellow fingers is correlated with whether the subject 
develops lung cancer but only because smoking acts as a common cause of both effects. 
Now suppose that one manipulates E1 by manipulating C. Obviously E2 will also change 
under this manipulation of E1 so that if one applies the principle (suggested by the 
quotation from Collingwood above) that X causes Y whenever manipulation of X  is 
associated with changes in Y, one will be led to the mistaken conclusion that E1 causes 
E2.  What this shows is that not just any manipulation of a variable X should be regarded 
as an “appropriate” manipulation for the purposes of determining whether X causes Y.  In 
recent literature, a more restricted, technical notion of manipulation has been introduced 
to avoid the difficulty just described.  This is the notion of an  “intervention” (cf. Spirtes, 
Glmour and Scheines, 2000, Pearl 2000, Woodward, 2003).  Informally, an intervention 
on some candidate cause X with respect to a candidate effect Y is an “exogenous” change 
in X which is such that Y is affected, if at all, only through its relationship to X and not via 
some other causal route that does not go through X. Put slightly differently, an 
intervention on a candidate cause X with respect to a candidate effect Y should 
manipulate X in a way that is causally and statistically independent of all other causes of 
Y except those that lie directly on the causal route, if any, from X to Y.  (Intuitively, these 
other “off-route” causes of Y are potential confounding factors that need to be controlled 
for.) In the example above, an intervention on E1 would involve manipulating E1 in a way 
that is independent of C and other factors that might potentially confound the relationship 
between E1 and E2  This might be accomplished by, for example, a  randomized 
experiment in which subjects are assigned to conditions involving either yellow or non-
yellow fingers (e.g. by dying non-yellow fingers yellow or by removing stains from 
yellow fingers) in a way that is independent of whether the subject smokes. Of course we 
expect that under such a manipulation, there will be no association between finger color 
and the development of lung cancer and this shows that finger color does not cause lung 
cancer.  (For more details, as well as a discussion of the representation of interventions 
by means of directed graphs and structural equation modelling, see Spirtes, Glymour and 
Scheines, 2000, Pearl, 2000, Woodward, 2003). 
 Given the notion of an intervention, we might replace Collingwood’s version of a 
manipulability theory with something like the following:  
 
(M) X causes Y if and only if there are some possible interventions on X such that 
if they were to occur, Y would change.  
 
  Several additional comments about the notion of an intervention may be helpful. 
First, note that, as characterized above, the notion of an intervention makes no reference 
to distinctively human actions or to human abilities to manipulate—the notion is instead 
characterized in causal terms and in terms of facts about statistical independence.  Thus 
some naturally occurring process P which bears the right causal and statistical 
relationships to  X can count as intervention on X even if it does not involve human action 
(or at least deliberate human intervention) at any point. In this case, we have what is often 
described as a “natural experiment” – Mendelian randomization provides an example in 
the context of epidemiology (Davey Smith, Ebrahim, 2005).  Manipulations carried out 
by human beings can of course qualify as interventions, if they have right sort of causal 
and statistical characteristics, but when they do so, this will be because of these 
characteristics and not because they are performed by humans.  Introduction of the notion 
of an intervention helps to remove the anthropomorphism that otherwise infects 
manipulability accounts. 
Second, it should be apparent that the notion of an intervention (like the more 
general notion of a manipulation) is a causal notion. Thus in appealing to this notion in 
order to explicate what it is for X to cause Y, we have given up on the project of providing 
a  “reductive” account of causation. (Collingwood’s account is also patently non-
reductionist, since it makes use of such causally committed notions as “produce” and 
“prevent”). I will return below to the issue of how (as I think is the case) it is possible for 
a non-reductive account of causation to manage to be useful and illuminating.    
   Although (M) retains some of the basic commitments of Collingwood’s 
treatment of  “sense II” of cause, it avoids some difficulties faced by that account.  First, 
pace Collingwood, whether  (iii) Y changes (or is “produced” or prevented”) under a 
human action that changes  (or “produces or prevents”) X is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for it to be true that (iv) X causes Y. (iii) is not  sufficient for (iv) when the 
human action that changes X is confounded, as in example  involving smoking above.  
With respect to the issue of whether (iii) is necessary for (iv), it seems to me to be central 
to how we think about causation (both in Collingwood’s Sense II and whatever other 
“senses” of this notion may exist) that causal relationships can sometimes hold between 
factors in circumstances in which the manipulation of the cause is not within the power of 
any human being.  As noted above, it seems entirely correct to say that the gravitational 
attraction of the moon is causally responsible for the behaviour of the tides, even though 
this causal agent is   beyond the power of human beings to manipulate and this may well 
always be the case. (M) accommodates this by reformulating the connection between 
causation and what happens under interventions  as a counterfactual claim: for X to cause 
Y, it is not required that an intervention on X actually occur or be within human power, 
but merely that if some such an intervention were to occur, Y would change in some way.  
Even though (let us assume) human beings cannot carry out interventions that alter the 
position of the moon, it is none the less true that if such an intervention were to occur, 
this would be a way of affecting the tides.  
Collingwood’s own view of causal claims such as those about the effects of the 
position of the moon on the tides is that these involve a very different sense of “cause” 
than his sense II; he claims they employ a notion of cause  (which he calls sense III) 
which is   appropriate to “theoretical” as opposed to “natural” or “practical” science (p. 
96)  -- a notion according to which effects are invariably or unconditionally associated 
with their causes.  Presumably, he thus would be undisturbed by the observation that his 
manipulation-based sense II of causation  is unable to accommodate examples involving 
causes that humans are unable to manipulate.  However, Collingwood’s sharp separation 
between “practical” and “theoretical” science  (and between sense II and sense III of 
“cause”) seems unconvincing. The boundaries of what it is possible for human beings to 
manipulate obviously change with time (think of nuclear explosions, or space 
exploration) and it seems dubious that when a recognized causal relationship involving a 
cause that was previously unmanipulable (by humans) subsequently becomes 
manipulable, this involves a change in the “meaning” or sense of “cause” employed in 
that relationship. For example, when the once purely theoretical causal relationships (in 
Collingwood’s sense) of Newtonian mechanics used to characterize the behaviour of 
objects at a great distance from the surface of the earth were used more recently as the 
basis for manipulations of space craft visiting the surface of Mars, it seems very natural 
to suppose that the very same causal relationships described theoretically by Newtonian 
mechanics are those we have now learned to exploit practically in manipulating the space 
craft. In other words, Newtonian mechanics seems to describe causal relationships in the 
sense of relationships that are potentially exploitable for manipulation and control (even 
if at a particular moment in time we  lack the technology to exploit them)  and are in this 
respect like Collingwood’s sense II causal relationships rather than relationships that fall 
into some completely distinct category.  So it makes sense to formulate a version of a 
manipulability theory that, like (M), accommodates this fact.    
 
                                              III. 
 
Let me, by way of conclusion to this article, return to the issue of “circularity” 
raised above. I have already noted that a number of researchers have found it illuminating 
to connect causation and manipulation in broadly the way suggested by Collingwood. 
The puzzle this raises is how this connection can be fruitful, given that the notion of 
“manipulation” (and “intervention”) seems to presuppose the very notion of causation 
that we are trying to explicate.  
This is a difficult issue, deserving a more detailed treatment than I can give it 
here, but the following observations may be of some help.  First, note that while it is true 
that notions like “manipulation” and “intervention” carry causal commitments, they need 
not carry the same causal commitments as the very causal relationships we seek to learn 
about in performing experimental manipulations. That is, while to know that I have 
performed an intervention on X with respect to Y, I must have causal knowledge of 
various sorts (e.g., that the intervention is a cause of X, that it is independent of certain 
other causes of Y but not all such causes and so on), I do not have to know or to have 
already settled whether X causes Y, which is what I am trying to establish
3
.  In other 
words, I can use some causal information (that an intervention on X with respect to Y has 
occurred) to establish whether some new, different causal claim  (that X causes Y) is true.  
Indeed if this were not true, it is hard to see how we could ever learn about causal 
relationships by performing experiments. Thus, at least in this sort of case, no vicious 
circularity is present. Instead we have an illustration of the general principle that reliable 
inference to causal conclusions always requires additional background causal 
assumptions, in combination with other sorts of information that may be non-causal in 
character—e.g. correlational information.  This principle is pithily captured in 
Cartwright’s (1989) formulation: “no causes in, no causes out” (39).  
  Although this consideration may help to allay worries about unilluminating 
circularity in contexts in which an experimental manipulation is actually performed, it 
raises, as we noted above, a related question: How can a manipulability/interventionist 
conception of causation be useful or illuminating in situations in which an experimental 
manipulation is not actually performed—that is, in contexts in which one attempts to 
learn about causal relationships from non-experimental or “observational” data. (This of 
course is the typical context for causal inference in epidemiology.) The short answer to 
this question, articulated at length by a number of writers (including Pearl, 2000, Rubin, 
1974), is that an interventionist account of causation can function fruitfully in such a 
contexts by specifying clearly what one is aiming at in causal inference and what is 
required to achieve this goal: in non-experimental contexts one tries to infer what would 
happen to some candidate effect if (contrary to actual fact) one were to perform an 
experiment in which an intervention on the cause occurs.  In other words, one’s goal is to 
infer the outcome of a hypothetical experiment without doing the experiment. (This 
counterfactual formulation is incorporated into M). This suggests, among other things, a 
standard for evaluating proposed causal inferences: an inference to a causal claim will be 
reliable to the extent that  the inference warrants conclusions  about what would happen if  
the hypothetical experiment associated with the experiment were to be performed. Thus, 
given a candidate causal inference, the question we should ask is: what sort of data is 
required and what additional assumptions must hold for the inference to establish the 
claimed result about the hypothetical experiment associated with the causal claim? (As 
noted above, such additional assumptions, carrying causal commitments, will always be 
necessary.) As an illustration, consider an inference from observational data that makes 
use of an instrumental variable: suppose that the problem we face is to estimate b in a 
context in which the data generating process is represented by Y=bX+ U,  X and Y  are 
our candidates for cause and effect variables, respectively, and U is an error term that is 
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 This is somewhat obscured in Collingwood’s formulation, since he speaks of 
“producing or preventing” the effect by manipulating the cause, which might seem to 
suggest that one has already established whether there is a causal relationship between 
cause and effect.   A better formulation would require only that the candidate cause and 
effect are correlated under some interventions on the cause, as M does. 
correlated with X. As is well-known, we can do this (despite the correlation between X 
and U) if we can find an instrumental variable Z which (i) is associated with  X and (ii) is 
independent of U  and (iii) is independent of Y given X and U . When these conditions are 
satisfied, it is widely accepted that the use of the instrumental variable Z  allows us to 
estimate b and leads to reliable causal inferences.  (See, e.g.,  Greenland, 2000, Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009). Thinking of causal claims within an interventionist/manipulationist 
framework makes it transparent why this is the case: under these conditions, Z functions 
in a way that is equivalent to an intervention on X with respect to Y, so that any variation 
in Z which is associated with Y must be due to the causal influence of X on Y, rather than 
being due to some other source, such as a confounding variable. Many other causal 
inference procedures can be evaluated in a similar way, by asking whether they provide 
reliable information about the results of a hypothetical experiment.  
More generally, conceiving of causal claims as interventionists do, as having to 
do with the outcomes of hypothetical experiments, can play an important role in 
clarifying just what is meant by such claims and the evidence relevant to assessing them, 
even in contexts in which experiments cannot be performed. For example, the 
interverventionist framework forces us to specify candidate  causal variables in such a 
way that they are  possible targets of interventions, even if the interventions are not 
actually performed.  In particular, this means that the “unit” or entity intervened on must 
be such that it is characterized by a variable that can assume at least two possible values,  
and that it must be possible to intervene to change one of these values to the other,  with a 
corresponding change in the value of the effect. In other words, the cause variable must 
be a “treatment” variable and the effect variable should describe possible responses to 
that treatment. Not all candidates for causal variables will meet this condition. For 
example, instead of thinking of gender as a “cause” of differences in breast cancer rates 
among men and women, it is more perspicuous to think of the relevant causal variable as 
having to do with differences in the level of endogenous estrogens.  (cf. Joffe et al., 
2012.) The latter, unlike gender, is a variable which is a well-defined target of 
manipulation  and hence causal claims formulated in terms of this variable make it clearer 
what the associated hypothetical experiment is and what is claimed about the outcome of  
this manipulation.  
For all of these reasons, manipulability accounts of causation of the sort sketched 
by Collingwood remain a fruitful framework for thinking about causation.  
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